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COMMENTS
RECORDING CHATTEL MORTGAGES ON FIXTURES
Chattels that usually would become fixtures when annexed to realty
are commonly sold under some type of installment plan necessitating
a conditional sales contract or a chattel mortgage to secure an unpaid
part of the purchase price.
Such an instrument will, as between buyer and seller, preserve the
chattel character of the annexed item as the instrument is either ex-
pressly or by necessary implication an agreement that the item shall
remain personal property.' As against antecedent encumbrancers of
the realty such an agreement will be given effect if no material injury
to the freehold will result from removal of the chattel.2 A more trouble-
some problem that sellers face is in protecting their lien against the
claims of subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of the real estate.
Where the grantee of the realty takes with notice, actual or constructive,
of the rights of the seller of the chattel, these rights may be asserted
against him.' It is generally felt it would be inequitable to allow a
grantee who had notice of the lien upon the chattel to destroy it by
purchasing the land. Correlatively, where a purchaser for value of the
'Provident Mutual Ins. Co. v. Smith, 175 Wash. 356, 27 P. (2d) 580
(1933); Boeringa v. Perry, 96 Wash. 57, 164 Pac. 773 (1917); German Savings
& Loan Society v. Weber, 16 Wash. 95, 47 Pac. 224 (1896); Brinkley V.
Forkner, 117 Ind. 176, 19 N. E. 753 (1889); Tibbetts v. Horne, 65 N. H. 242,
23 Ati. 145, 15 L. R. A. 56 (1889); Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344 (1859);
Henkle v. Dillon, 15 Ore. 610, 17 Pac. 148 (1888); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
(3d ed, 1939) § 612. Even buildings annexed to realty by concrete and
wooden piers have been held removable. Schmidt v. Dubois, 201 Wis. 631,
231 N. W. 181 (1930).
This rule is subject only to the limitation that the chattel cannot com-
pletely lose its identity in its annexation. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY
(1936) § 153, p. 680.
2In the leading case on this doctrine, Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq.
244, 14 Atl. 279, 6 Am. STAT. REP. 889 (1888), the court based its decision upon
the ground that if the chattel can be removed without material injury to
the freehold, the antecedent encumbrancer of the land loses none of the
security for which he originally bargained. Accord: Holt v. Henley, 232
U. S. 637 (1914); Provident Mutual Ins. Co. v. Smith, 175 Wash. 356, 27
P. (2d) 580 (1933); Ballard v. Alaska Theater Co., 93 Wash. 655, 161 Pac.
478( 1916); German Savings & Loan Society v. Weber, 16 Wash. 95, 47
Pac. 224 (1896). For a case where the court felt the removal would dimin-
ish the real estate mortgagee's security, see Comly v. Lehmann, 218 Iowa
644, 253 N. W. 501 (1934).
An after-acquired property clause in the mortgage will not include
the subsequently annexed chattel. Wood v. Holly Mfg. Co., 100 Ala. 326,
13 So. 948 (1893). Contra: Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray 522 (Mass. 1860); Pa.
Choc. Co. v. Hershey Bros., 316 Pa. 292, 175 Atl. 694 (1934).
3 Sword v. Low, 122 Ill. 487, 13 N. E. 826 (1887); Harvard Financial Corp.
v. Greenblatt Const. Co., Inc., 261 N. Y. 169, 184 N. E. 748 (1933); Gen. Pet.
Corp. of Calif. v. Schefter, 141 Ore. 349, 16 P. (2d) 645 (1932); Wolf Co. v.
Kutch, 147 Wis. 209, 132 N. W. 981 (1911). See Notes (1921) 13 A. L. R.
448; (1931) 73 A. L. R. 748; (1934) 88 A. L. R. 1318. Cf. Fifield v. Farmers;
Bank, 148 Il. 163, 35 N. E. 802 (1893).
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realty takes without notice of the chattel mortgage or conditional sales
contract, it is generally held his rights are not affected by the instru-
ment.4 Most of the cases explain this result by pointing out the fact
that the annexed item apparently forms a part of the land and that
purchasers of realty should be protected from adverse claims which do
not appear in real property records. Some courts have reasoned that
the chattel lienor, by leaving a chattel in the possession of the land-
owner to annex to realty, has enabled the annexor to mislead a pur-
chaser of the land and must sustain the loss of his security.-
The scope of this comment is limited to the problem of the chattel
mortgagee in assuring notice of his lien to those who subsequently pur-
chase or encumber the realty. The situation of the conditional vendor
has been simplified by a 1933 amendment to the conditional sales con-
tract filing statutes which provide that where the chattel is to be
attached to a building, in addition to being filed, the contract also must
be indexed and recorded with real estate mortgages.8 However, since
there are several factors which may make the use of a chattel mortgage
more desirable than a conditional sales contract, it is more than merely
academic to discuss the possibility of giving constructive notice where
a chattel mortgage is used to secure the transaction. The Washington
court has been openly hostile to conditional sales contracts and on occa-
sion has said that these instruments "are not favored in law."' 7 The con-
ditional sales contract* cannot be used in instances where the credit
is actually advanced by someone other than the seller." The chattel
'Tibbetts v. Home, 65 N. H. 242, 23 Atl. 145, 15 L. R. A. 56 (1889);
Kohler Co. v. Brasun, 249 N. Y. 224, 164 N. E. 31 (1918); Brennan v. Whit-
aker, 14 Ohio St. 446 (1864); Landigan v. Mayer, 32 Ore. 245, 51 Pac. 649(1898). This viewpoint was approved by the Washington court by the
dictum of Parker, J., in King v. Title Trust Co., 111 Wash. 508, 191 Pac.
748 (1920): "... it [an agreement that the chattel shall remain personalty]
... will not preserve the personal status of the material or thing so sold
and prevent it from becoming a fixture and a part of the realty as against
a subsequent encumbrancer who has no notice..."
See also Notes (1921) 13 A. L. R. 448; (1936) 34 MIcHL L. REv. 426;
BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY (1936) 685. Cf. Peaks v. Hutchinson, 96 Me.
530, 53 AUl. 38, 59 L. R. A. 279 (1902).
5Thompson v. Smith, 111 Iowa 718, 83 N. W. 789, 50 L. R. A. 780 (1900);
Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt. 546 (1871).
1REM. REV. STAT. §§ 3790, 3791. A similar provision is found in section 7
of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, 2 U. L. A. 12 (1922), which provides
that where chattels are annexed to realty, the contract must be fled with
the conveyances of land or the reservation of title is void as against
grantees without notice of the realty. This rule is made applicable only
to those cases in which the chattel is "severable without material injury
to the freehold." It is difficult to see a sound reason for this limitation.
If a grantee of the realty has notice of the conditional seller's right to
remove the chattel, the grantee should not take any greater right than
his grantor. Against the grantor, the conditional seller may remove, even
though material injury may result. Note 1, supra.
'Lahn & Simmons v. Matzen Woolen Mills, 147 Wash. 560, 266 Pac. 697
(1928); West American Finance Co. v. Finstad, 146 Wash. 315, 262 Pac.
636 (1928).
"For example: A wishes to buy a furnace from B, who insists upon cash.
C advances the money and secures the repayment by a conditional sales
contract from C to A. If a loan of money is actually secured, the courts
will declare the instrument a chattel mortgage in spite of the fact that it
1940]
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mortgage allows the mortgagee to realize on his security and, at the
same time, retain his right to recover any deficiency-an advantage
which is not open to the conditional vendor in a state that requires
him to elect to repossess or sue for the unpaid part of the purchase
price.' Also, as a matter of business policy, some firms may find that
the use of a chattel mortgage is more desirable because of the public
attitude that conditional sales contracts expose purchasers to unneces-
sary risks of forfeiture.
There is some controversy as to just what will give the grantee of
the realty notice of a chattel mortgage on a chattel attached to the
realty. A growing minority of jurisdictions hold that the filing of such
an instrumant with the regular chattel mortgages gives constructive
notice of the seller's rights in the chattel to purchasers of the realty.'"
These holdings are usually based upon the theory that the presence
of the fixture should place a purchaser upon inquiry as to its history
and that the filed chattel mortgages cannot be said to be out of the
line of title to the real estate. Washington, in the case of Boeringa v.
Perry,11 which involved imbedded pipes sold subject to a chattel mort-
gage, on the land of a desert land entryman, seemed to commit itself
to this view. The chattel mortgage was filed with the chattel records
only and subsequently a second entryman took over the land. The
mortgagee of the pipes brought a foreclosure action which was sus-
tained against the second entryman. Speaking for the court, Judge
Holcomb said:
our statute . . . provided ... that every such mortgage
filed and indexed in pursuance of this act 'shall be held and
considered to be full and sufficient notice to all the world of
the existence and conditions thereof.' The effect of this pro-
vision is that the due filing of a chattel mortgage .. imports
as much as actual and positive notice of the mortgage and of
all its conditions to all persons dealing with the chattel there-
after ... The respondent had notice, by the filing of the chat-
tel mortgage, that the pipe embedded and installed in the land
purports to be a conditional sales contract. Mahon v. Nelson, 148 Wash.
110, 268 Pac. 144 (1928); Olsen v. Legal Adjustment Bureau, 142 Wash.
446, 253 Pac. 643 (1927); Lyon v. Nourse, 104 Wash. 309, 176 Pac. 359 (1918).
OThe conditional vendor must either repossess or affirm the sale and
sue for the purchase price. He cannot do both. Kimble Motor Car Co. v.
Androw, 125 Wash. 225, 215 Pac. 340 (1923); Stewart & Holmes Drug Co.
v. Reed, 74 Wash. 401, 133 Pac. 577 (1913); Jones v. Reynolds, 45 Wash. 371,
88 Pac. 577 (1907). A purported conditional sales contract which provides
for repossession and resale of the property with the right of a deficiency
against the buyer is a chattel mortgage in the view of the Washington
court. Morton Organ Co. v. Armour, 173 Wash. 462, 23 P. (2d) 887 (1933);
Roberts v. Speck, 170 Wash. 324, 16 P. (2d) 463 (1932); Raymond Bros.
Impact Pulverizer Co. v. Thomas, 159 Wash. 550, 294 Pac. 219 (1930). For
an extensive comparison of the chattel mortgage with the conditional
sales contract, see Starr, Conditional Sales and Chattel Mortgages (1934)
9 WASH. L. REV. 143.
'
0Sword v. Low, 122 Ill. 487, 13 N. E. 826 (1887); Sowden & Co. v. Craig,
26 Iowa 156, 96 Am. Dec. 125 (1868); Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344 (1859);
Monarch Laundry v. Westbrook, 109 Va. 382, 63 S. E. 1070 (1909). Note
(1921) 13 A. L. R. 485. Cf. Comment (1928) 13 ST. Louis L. Rv. 255 which
suggests this is the weight of authority.
196 Wash. 57, 164 Pac. 773 (1917).
[VOL. 15
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was chattel property upon which the appellant had a lien by
his chattel mortgage." 12
The force of this case is considerably weakened by the fact that
there was an alternative ground for the result in that the second entry-
man had given no value. Later, in King v. Title Trust Co.,1 3 our court
said that the true basis for the Boeringa decision was that the claimant
of the realty was not a purchaser for value. Therefore, it is doubtful
whether the Boeringa case is definitive in aligning Washington with the
view of the minority of jurisdictions that the filing with the chattel
records alone will impart constructive notice to grantees of the realty.
The weight of authority is that the chattel instrument cannot give
constructive notice to the purchasers of the realty as the prospective
mortgagee or purchaser of real property cannot be expected to search
records which relate primarily to personal property.' 4 This position
appears to be sound. The almost universal practice is to keep the
realty and personalty records separately. It is advisable to discourage
all claims adverse to the title of land which do not appear in the real
property records. Even where a common index is used for both chattel
and realty records, a searcher is apt to check only the latter when in-
vestigating the title to land.
If the Washington court should decide to overlook the language of
the Boeringa case and follow the majority view, then the only possibility
of the chattel mortgagee's serving.constructive notice of his rights on
purchasers of the land is to record his mortgage upon the chattel with
the real estate records. However, it is essential that if such recording
is to carry constructive notice to anyone, there must be a statute author-
izing the recording. Our court has followed the general rule that
recordation without statutory authorization for such is a nullity.'5
Although there is no statute clearly covering the recording of chattel
mortgages with the realty records comparable to that provided for
conditional sales contracts,' 6 it may be reasonable to say that the
chattel mortgage, after the annexation of the item, is an encumbrance
upon the realty and as such is entitled to be put on record with real
property mortgages.' 7 The instrument seems to be one ". . . by which
the title to ... real property may be affected. . ." and thus within the
definition of a "conveyance" entitled to be recorded under our real
property act.' Certainly, if a jurisdiction follows the view that a bona
fide purchaser of the realty may take the chattel as part of the land,
such purchaser cannot object to recordation of the chattel mortgage
as an encumbrance upon realty as the very basis for the theory upon
1Id. at 62.
13111 Wash. 508, 191 Pac. 748 (1920).
"Elliot v. Hudson, 18 Cal. App. 642, 124 Pac. 103 (1912); Tibbetts v.
Home, 65 N. H. 242, 23 AUt. 145, 15 L. R. A. 56 (1889); Brennan v. Whitaker,
15 Ohio St. 446 (1864); Schmidt v. Dubois, 201 Wis. 631, 231 N. W. 181
(1930); 2 TFFAN-Y, REAL. PRoPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 613, n. 16; BRowN, PER-
soNAI. PRoPERTY (1936) § 154, n. 52.
"Flynn v. Garford Motor Truck Co., 149 Wash. 264, 270 Pac. 806 (1928);
Dial v. Inland Logging Co., 52 Wash. 81, 100 Pac. 157 (1909); Howard v.
Shaw, 10 Wash. 151, 38 Pac. 746 (1894); Gen. Motors Acc. Corp. v. Kline,
78 F. (2d) 618 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
6REwr. REV. STAT. §§ 3790, 3791.
"Book Review (1903), 16 Hnv. L. REV. 531.
" RtEmL REV. STAT. § 10596-1.
1940]
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which the grantee of the land recovers is that the chattel had become
a part of the realty. Additional support is given the efficacy of such
recording by the view sometimes expressed that the chattel mortgage
does not actually keep the chattel from becoming realty, as the language
of most opinions indicates, but is more accurately a license to sever
and reconvert to personalty a part of the realty.19
There are two other statutes which afford a possible basis for recorda-
tion of the chattel instrument with realty records, but both appear to
contemplate situations different from the one under discussion. In addi-
tion to the chattel mortgage filing statute, there is a separate provision
for the recording of chattel mortgages securing a debt of over $300.21
However, the purpose of such recording has been construed as being
to minimize the danger of the instrument being lost or stolen.2 1 An-
other statute provides for the recordation with real estate mortgages
of a mortgage upon property of a mixed character, consisting in part
of realty and in part of personalty. 22 From its terms, however, this
statute is intended primarily to cover mortgages upon railroad property
and it is probable that a chattel mortgage upon annexed personalty
would be held to be without the purview of this section.
Under the present statutes and cases, the person who wishes to sell
personalty which will be attached to realty, and to use a chattel mort-
gage rather than a conditional sales contract to secure the transaction,
cannot be sure how he must proceed to protect his lien from subsequent
purchasers or encumbrancers of the realty. He may file it as a regular
chattel mortgage and hope that the Washington court will sustain such
filing as constructive notice to those dealing with the land. He may
record it with real property mortgages in the hope that the statutes
'SIn Powers v. Dennison, 30 Vt. 749, 756 (1858), the court says: " . . .
these articles, though chattels, yet when affixed by a tenant to the free-
hold, cease to be goods and chattels by becoming part of the freehold, and
though it is in his power to reduce them to the state of goods and chattels
again by severing them, yet until they are severed they are part of the
freehold." (Italics supplied).
Although holding that filing with chattel records would, not impart
notice to those subsequently dealing with the realty, Brennan v. Whitaker,
15 Ohio St. 446 (1864), contains the following statement: "It devolved upon
the chattel mortgagee who sought to change the legal character of the
chattels after they were annexed to the realty ... to pursue the mode pro-
vided by law for encumbering the kind of estate to which it appeared
to the world to belong..."
Oakland Bank of Savings v. Calif. Pressed Brick Co., 183 Cal. 295, 191
Pac. 524 (1920) held that a conditional seller, from the fact that he knew
the chattel would be attached to realty, thereby agreed that the personalty
was to be converted into real property and by this transformation the con-
ditional sale was brought under the operation of laws for the recording of
contracts affecting realty. See also Comments (1920) 8 CALIF. L. REV. 442;(1934) 18 MINN. L. REV. 812; Note (1910) 10 COL. L. REV. 581.
OR~mv. REV. STAT. § 3785. This statute is permissive so far as protecting
the lien from those subsequently dealing with the chattel. Goddard v.
Morgan, 193 Wash. 83, 74 P. (2d) 894 (1937). Thus it might be argued
that it was intended as statutory authority for recording with the real
property record.
21First National Bank v. White Dulany Co., 121 Wash. 386, 209 Pac. 861
(1922).
--REm. REV. STAT. § 10597. There are apparently no cases construing this
statute.
[VOL. 15
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will be construed as giving authority for such recording so that it will
carry constructive notice to grantees of the realty. Under either pro-
cedure, he subjects himself to the possibility that his hopes will not
be realized.
To clear up the course open to such a chattel mortgagee and to
fairly protect purchasers of the land from claims of chattel mortgagees
which are not in the real property records, it is suggested that a pro-
vision requiring recordation with the realty records similar to that at
present provided for conditional sales contracts would be a highly de-
sirable legislative enactment. Such a statute seems to afford the best
way to adjust the rights of the chattel mortgagee and those who sub-
sequently deal with the realty.
Ross REIm.
RECOLLECTION ON THE WITNESS STAND
The art of witness interrogation is difficult where the witness on the
stand is unable to narrate the event which he has observed because of
some present defect in his recollection.' In such case there are the
following possibilities:
A. The impressions once made upon the mind of the witness may
be revived by some means. This is "present recollection revived". 2
B. If a record has been made of the witness' impressions, such record
may come in as evidence if certain requirements be met. This is "past
recollection recorded". 3
The purpose of this comment is to collect the Washington cases in-
volving these situations and to indicate whether or not our court fol-
lows the usual rules, analyzing those cases which have departed there-
from which special regard to some recent decisions which seem out of
line.4 Reference will also be made to illustrative'cases from the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals as indicative of the rules followed by the
Federal Court for this circuit.
A. PRESENT RECOLLECTION REVIVED
The witness testifies as to what is actually called up from the re-
cesses of his memory. For the purpose of reviving a recollection any-
thing may be used.5 Most commonly it is a writing, around which
centers most of the difficulty because of the frequent failure to dis-
tinguish between the present situation where the witness is now testi-
fying as to what has been recalled to his mind and the situation,
treated subsequently, where the witness, though without any present
1 Essential testimonial qualifications are observation, recollection, and
narration. 1 WIGMnOP, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 478.
2 id. § 758 et seq.
3 2 id. § 734, et seq.
' State v. Harkness, 1 Wn. (2d) 530, 96 P. (2d) 460 (1939); Clausen v.
J6nes, 191 Wash. 334, 71 P. (2d) 362 (1937).
Jewett v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 955 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926); Hinkleman
v. Pasteelnick, 3 N. J. Misc. 1010, 130 Atl. 441 (1925); Note (1926) 24 MIcH.
L. REV. 420
1940]
